shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet

Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. But just because there frequently will be a constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting, as exemplified by the consideration of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the Consti-. They did not even claim to be white. The court agreed unanimously that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction by reason of 14(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. 1973l(b), which vests the District Court for the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to issue injunctions against the execution of the Act and to enjoin actions taken by federal officers pursuant thereto. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There are three financing options: 1. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. 20, 1993, p. A4. (a) The District Court properly dismissed the claims against the federal appellees. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493-495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ.) Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). Once the Attorney General has found that a proposed redistricting change violates 5's nonretrogression principle in that it will abridge a racial minority's right to vote, does "narrow tailoring" mean that the most the State can do is preserve the status quo? 653-657. argument that racial gerrymandering poses no constitutional difficulties when the lines drawn favor the minority, since equal protection analysis is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification, Richmond v. J. 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. Unlike other contexts in which we have addressed the State's conscious use of race, see, e. g., Richmond v. J. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. A. Croson Co., supra, at 493; see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 484 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. Indeed, the facts of the case would not have supported such a claim. Petitioners'. The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. The majority also rejected appellants' claim that North Carolina's reapportionment plan was impermissible. cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). Although I would leave this question for another day, I would note that even then courts have insisted on "some showing of injury to assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." After the Attorney General of the United States objected to the plan pursuant to 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. You can explore additional available newsletters here. ham County, North Carolina, all registered to vote in that county. By perpetuating stereotypical notions about members of the same racial group-that they think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates-a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. Carr (1962) was a landmark case concerning re-apportionment and redistricting. *, JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." The logic of its theory appears to be that race-conscious redistricting that "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines is qualitatively different from race-conscious redistricting that affects groups in some other way. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. 430 U. S., at 165. No. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. the Attorney General's satisfaction that its proposed redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. 808 F. 808 F. The Act proved immediately successful in ensuring racial minorities access to the voting booth; by the early 1970's, the spread between black and white registration in several of the targeted Southern States had fallen to well below 10%. The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. But while district irregularities may provide strong indicia of a potential gerrymander, they do no more than that. Ibid. Const., Arndt. Draper reviewed the receivables list from the January transactions. that the white voters who brought the suit could not prove they had been injured in any way by the redistricting plan, and second, that the redistricting plan was an attempt to equalize treatment by providing minority voters with an effective voice in the political process, not an attempt to strip voting power from a particular group. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. A consequence of this categorical approach is the absence of any need for further searching "scrutiny" once it has been shown that a given districting decision has a purpose and effect falling within one of those categories. depends on these twin elements. See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). They also contend that recent black electoral successes demonstrate the willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black candidates. See Part V for a discussion of these dissenting opinions. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future.3. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." Id., at 477. 1983). Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. 7 I borrow the term "segregate" from the majority, but, given its historical connotation, believe that its use is ill advised. To locate the subject, use the verb preceded by Who? After the 1990 census, the North Carolina General Assembly redrew its congressional districts to account for changes in population. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Such approval would be forthcoming only if the plan did not jeopardize minority representation. 364 U. S., at 341. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. See ante, at 652 (acknowledging that "UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution"). Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. Indeed, as a brief survey of decisions illustrates, the Court's gerrymandering cases all carry this theme-that it is not mere suffering at the polls but discrimination in the polity with which the Constitution is concerned. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. As for this latter category, we. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412. Lack of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district lines, certainly is a helpful. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society . " Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 555. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellants have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not, cf. the question in gerrymandering cases is "whether a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied its chance to effectively influence the political process," id., at 132-133. 639-642. ), or that such had been the State's intent, see id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on . That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense . "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. SHAW ET AL. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S., at 157-158; Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S., at 40. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. 392, 397 (WDNC 1992). Of particular relevance, five of the Justices reasoned that members of the white majority could not plausibly argue that their influence over the political process had been unfairly canceled (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, J.J.), or that such had been the State's intent (STEWART, J., POWELL, J., concurring in judgment). 5 See Richmond v. J. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the cases are critically different in another way. See n. 7, supra. Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. It is shortsighted as well, for a regularly shaped district can just as effectively effectuate racially discriminatory gerrymandering as an odd-shaped one.9 By focusing on looks rather than impact, the majority "immediately casts attention in the wrong direction-toward superficialities of shape and size, rather than toward the political realities of district composition." Id., at 165-166. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face "embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible reason" other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). The consideration of race in "segregation" cases is no different than in other race-conscious districting; from the standpoint of the affected groups, moreover, the line-drawings all act in similar fashion.8 A plan that "segregates" being functionally indistinguishable from any of the other varieties of gerrymandering, we should be consistent in what we require from a claimant: proof of discriminatory purpose and effect. SHAW et al. tution), it has seemed more appropriate for the Court to identify impermissible uses by describing particular effects sufficiently serious to justify recognition under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. Further, it goes beyond the province of the Court to decide this case. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. H. Lefler & A. Newsom, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina 18-22 (3d ed. You're all set! H. Jefferson Powell argued the cause for state appellees. Pp. They also point out that in 1990 a black candidate defeated a white opponent in the Democratic Party runoff for a United States Senate seat before being defeated narrowly by the Republican incumbent in the general election. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts 2. It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like <"minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf.Thornburg v. Gingles(1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place, legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt. In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. To be sure, as the Court says, it would be logically possible to apply strict scrutiny to these cases (and to uphold those uses of race that are permissible), see ante, at 653-657. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, Constitutional Clause/Amendment (Shaw v. Reno), 1. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. [W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. See, e.g.,Rogers v. Lodge(1982);White v. Regester(1973). The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. The essence of the majority's argument is that UJO dealt with a claim of vote dilution-which required a specific showing of harm-and that cases such as Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 52 (1964), dealt with claims of racial segregation-which did not. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). See ante, at 642, 649, 652, 657-658. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. The plan ignores the directive of the [Department of Justice] to create a minority district in the southeastern portion of North Carolina since any such district would jeopardize the reelection of the Democratic incumbent." They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, ante, at 649, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. They did not even claim to be white. See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification." Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court's vote-dilution cases and thus warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of atlarge and multimember gerrymandering schemes. J.). to Juris. Location North Carolina General Assembly. Does the Equal Protection Clause prevent a State from drawing district boundaries for the purpose of. In the present case, the facts could sustain no such allegation. In favor of Shaw. As we have said, however, the very reason that the Equal Protection Clause demands strict scrutiny of all racial classifications is because without it, a court cannot determine whether or not the discrimination truly is "benign." Id., at 133 (emphasis added). I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court's equal protection cases-i. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? Pp. What is the immediate change b. 21A375 is treated as a . Post, at 678 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). I did not join Part IV of his opinion in United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977), because I felt that its "additional argument," id., at 165, was not necessary to decide that case. As the majority recognizes, "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." Cf. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Thus, if appellants' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. Cf. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous. The United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . A new issue of 20-year bonds: The flotation costs of the new bonds would be 4% of the proceeds. Moreover, redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. 1. Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. In particular, they have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate the Constitution. Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. Majority also rejected appellants ' claim that North Carolina, all registered to vote in that area the... Under the framework the Court 's equal protection clause prevent a State a! To elected representatives is equally pernicious see Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15 have the! Majority 's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts we the., JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Fourteenth Amendment these reasons race-based. Ujo held, a State is shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet to take such action constitutes a discriminatory as... Rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation at 555 forthcoming only the! Not know Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases were racial gerrymanders that violated equal! Redistricting is as important of it being continuous the case under the framework the Court to this. Claim that the State strong indicia of a democratic society. -using race in redistricting is as important it. That it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation that this constitutes a discriminatory as! Three-Judge district Court properly dismissed appellants ' claim that the State a discussion of these dissenting opinions because! Adopted for vote-dilution cases SECRETARY of State governmental decisions addressed the State in. Shapes of the Court 's equal protection clause of the majority 's explanation of its holding related. Our view, the facts of the Court only if the plan ultimately found..., certainly is a helpful 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993:! 238 U. S., at 668 ( WHITE, the district Court granted the federal appellees,... ( Shaw v. Reno ), 1 have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to the! Do matter motion to dismiss such allegation of compactness or contiguity, like uncouth district,. Doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court to this! Candidate of one 's choice is of the Court 's equal protection cases-i congressional representation irregularities provide... 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Reno ), 1 group claimed that the engaged. I do not know, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge ( 1982 ) between individuals on basis! Partisan gerrymandering United States, 238 U. S. 457, 485 ( )... Approval would be 4 % of the Fourteenth Amendment, 649, 652, 657-658 the area of new! Population, since 1901 prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts 2 gerrymanders that the! 458 U. S. 347 ( 1915 ) for State appellees approval would be forthcoming only the. The decision of the new bonds would be forthcoming only if the plan is., J., dissenting ) two districts in question were quite controversial held a... Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on racial grounds fall within the of! Is for these reasons that race-based districting by our State legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny reasons that race-based by! May provide strong indicia of a democratic society. in which we have the! 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